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SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DAVID R. WILLIAMS, d/b/a INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS,

1,

)

Plaintiff,

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT,
FRANK WARNER and EUGENE
S. LAMBERT, COMMISSIONERS
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH,

I

\
))

Case No.
12871

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff applied to the Utah Public Service Commission for a certificate of convenience and necessity which
would allow him to operate a public mobile radio-tele·
phone communications system in the central area of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
The Public Service Commission, by commissioners
Hal S. Bennett, Donald Hacking and John T. Vernieu,

on February 3, 1972 denied plaintiff's application. Plain.
tiff made application for rehearing on February 22, 1971.
The Public Service Commission, by commissioners Hai
S. Bennett, Frank Warner and Eugene S. Lambert denied
plaintiff's application for rehearing on March 10, 1972.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks to have this Court reverse the Public
Service Commission's Conclusion in its Report and Order
on the grounds that the same is unlawful because it is
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, does not follow or
properly interpret the applicable law, is contrary to the
Commission's own Findings of Fact, and ignores certain
other essential and material facts which are adverse to
said Conclusion.
Plaintiff also seeks a review of the lawfulness of the
Commission's (1) admitted reliance on a non-expert ad·
visor for technical and legal advice in relation to mobile
radio service, and ( 2) the propriety of such reliance when
the Commission knew said advisor had business and per·
sonal interests which placed him in a conflict of interest
position in opposition to plaintiff's application. Plaintiff
contends that said reliance (1) negates the presumption
of expertness afforded the Commission's Findings, and (2)
is a violation of plaintiff's constitutional right to due pro·
cess of law under the constitutions of the United States
and the State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following Facts have been divided into numbered
paragraphs to facilitate referencing.
Plaintiff applied for a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the Utah Public Service Commission
(Commission) to furnish two-way mobile radio telephone
service as a radio common carrier (RCC) to the public
in the central area of Utah.
1.

2. The central area of Utah has a population in
excess of 800,000 people (R-873 (Exhibit 66) - Counties
of Salt Lake, Weber, Davis and Utah).
3. Mobile Radio Telephone Service, Inc. (Mobile)
is the only non wire-line RCC in the central area of Utah
(Finding No. 4) and has been operating under a certificate from the Commission since 1962 (Finding No. 14).
4. The president of Mobile testified that it has 63
two-way mobile radio telephone units in service (R-103)
on 2 VHF (Very High Frequency) channels granted by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (R-20).
5. The FCC has presently authorized 21 two-way
mobile radio channels (7 VHF (R-40; See Finding No.
13) and 14 UHF (illtra High Frequency) (R-509)) for
use by non wire-line RCC's in the central area of Utah.
The granting of such channels as well as all operational
aspects of mobile radio communications are determined
and regulated by the FCC.
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6. Ever since 1966 by its own Exhibit Mobile has
had approximately the same number of two-way mobile
radio telephones in service on its 2 VHF channels (R
826 (Exhibit 51, page B-11) ) .
7. Mobile admitted that its 2 VHF channels have
been crowded for several years (R-37, See R-684 (Exhibit
24); See R-88-90) but that it did not apply to the FCC
for additional channels until October 28, 1969 and then
it applied for 3 UHF channels (R-689 (Exhibit 30)). Two
of the said UHF channels were granted by the FCC prim
to June, 1970, but had not been placed in service by Mo·
bile at the conclusion of plaintiff's hearing before the
Commission in June, 1971 (Finding No. 13). VHF two·
way mobile telephone units cannot be operated on UHF
channels (R-473; Also see R-50) and so channel crowding
on Mobile's VHF channels cannot be relieved unless the
number of users on the VHF channels are reduced or
Mobile acquires more VHF channels for use with its pres·
ent subscribers (See R-473).
8. Mobile was the only person to protest the grant·
ing of the plaintiff's application.
9. The Commission's Finding No. 9 states as fol·
lows:
"9. The exhibits of the applicant clearly
dicate that the number of RCC two-way mobile
units in the central area of Utah is
lower than other intermountain
areas. Some areas are noted to have a mobile UI11t
for approximately every 2,000 persons in gross
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population of the area. The comparable ratio of
mobile units in the population in central Utah is
less than one unit per 10,000 population" (R-921).
10. A number of the Commission's Findings relating
to the public need for additional mobile radio service are
set forth verbatim herein. All parentheticals and emphasis added will be noted.
The Commission's Findings:
"4. There is presently being offered to the
public in the central Utah area mobile radio service by Mountain Bell Telephone Company (a
wire-line company) and by Mobile Radio Telephone Service, Inc. (a non wire-line RCC). Each
of these two companies indicated that they had
held orders for persons desiring service. Mountain
Bell had 15 subscribers on a waiting list and Mobile Radio Telephone Service had 12 subscribers
on its waiting list. Additional public witnesses
testified to the need for additional mobile radio
service, but they had not placed an order for such
service with either of the present utilities because
of crowded channel conditions." (Parentheticals
and emphasis added.) (R-920).
"7. Mountain Bell Telephone Company
(which has 176 two-way mobile radio telephone
units on six channels) will not accept additional
subscribers because the present channels are filled
to their capacity. This company has no present
plans to install additional channels." (Parenthetical and emphasis added.) (R-921).
"5. Neil Goodsell, M.D., who administers a
private paging service for a group of physicians
(Medic-Call), testified that he would recommend
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to the 65 or 70 physicians who use the system that
they transfer to a common carrier if an acceptable
one were available, because of the administrative
problems which the physicians have encountered
in their private operation." (Parenthetical ana
emphasis added.) (R-921).

"6. There are approximately 300 private radio mobile systems in the Salt Lake City area.
Many of these have been placed in service because
of the overloading problems on the channels of the
two carriers above referred to. Several witnesses
testified that they would prefer the services of a
common carrier were such services adequate."
(Emphasis added.) (R-921).
11. Mobile's own subscribers cited the need for ad·
ditional sezvice (R-682-84 (Exhibits 22, 23, 24)).
12. Fifty per cent ( 50 %) of Mountain Bell's sub·
scribers who terminate its mobile radio sezvice do so be·
cause of channel crowding (R-362). Mountain Bell has
other customers (in addition to those on its waiting list)
who would resume sezvice if the channels were less
crowded (R-645). One customer presently using Moun·
ta.in Bell's mobile system testified that he had to wait
approximately 5 months in 1971 before there was channel
space available so that his telephone could be installed
in his automobile (R-379).
13. Plaintiff presently has approximately fifty per·
sons who expect to subscribe to the mobile radio service
he proposes to offer (R-652).
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14. The Commission found that plaintiff was technically and financially qualified to provide the proposed
service (Finding No. 10, R-921).
15. In the hearing Commissioner Hacking acknowledged the public need for the service applied for but
apparently failed to comprehend that the FCC will not
grant the use of mobile radio channels until the State
authority has granted a certificate of convenience and
necessity. Commissioner Hacking's comments indicate
that he believed the Commission could not act until the
plaintiff had obtained channels from the FCC, even
though he stated that plaintiff had shown the public need
for the p:coposed service.
(R-532)
"COMMISSIONER HACKING: Well-but,
then you get to this situation - and I think maybe
we've somewhat the same situation right here there's a growing public need for this type of service, and it's to a degree growing by leaps and
bounds. Nobody can fully serve that need unless
- no single party, and maybe no combination of
parties can serve that need unless the Federal
Communications gives them permission, licensed
channels.
So, you get in a situation where you've got
the hen or the egg - which come first here, the
hen or the egg, and what will the state commission
do in the meantime when they're trying to find
out whether the egg is going to be coming forth
or the chicken - which is going to come first?"
(Emphasis added.)
(R-534)
"COMMISSIONER HACKING: Well, now,
you've got the same doggoned thing here - an
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applicant (or a radio common carrier certificate
can come in and show a need - I don't think it'i
difficult in this day and age for any applicant to
show_ a pretty strong public need for this type o/
service. He can also show - may be able to shou'
financial ability, but he can't show that he hm
those air channels to perform the service ... and
he has got to get the license from somebody
to do that.
So, that's the kind of thing we're confronted
with here, isn't it?" (Emphasis added.)

16. Harold Mordkofsky, Washington, D. C., the only
expert witness who testified on FCC matters, stated that
the FCC will not grant an applicant a license for mobile
radio channels in states where the mobile radio business
is regul,ated by state authority unless such applicant Jws
first obtained a certificate of authority from the particu·
l,ar State to operate a mobile radio business (R-533).
17. Amos R. Jackson (Jackson) who represented
the Commission as its expert in plaintiff's hearing is a
principal in and the engineer for Intermountain Engineers
Incorporated (Intermountain) (R-432-33) which furn·
ished services to Mobile within a year prior to the plain·
tiff's hearing before the Commission (R-434; See R-418·
19).
18. Jackson and Telpower Services, Incorporated
(Telpower) assisted Mobile in the preparation of Exhibits
used before the Commission in the hearing (R-390-91).
19. Jackson's teenage children are employees of Tel·
power (R-435). Telpower was providing management ser·
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vices to Mobile at the time of plaintiff's hearing before
the Commission (R-416).
20. The offices of Intermountain, Telpower and
,Jackson were at the same address and all had the same
telephone number (R-387-88).
21. Commissioner Hacking stated that Jackson was
not an expert on mobile radio (R-445). Jackson does not
have a radio license from the FCC (R-433).
22. Jackson is not an attorney (R-433) but advised
the Commission on legal and technical matters in regard
to mobile radio (R-440-42). Jackson also advised the
Commission about the qualifications of RCC applicants
(R-439-41; See R-453-55).
23. Jackson was charged by the Commission with
inspecting the facilities and operation of RCC's and reporting to the Commission but admitted that he had
never personally inspected the facilities or operation of
Mobile (R-460-61).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION'S
DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION
IS UNLAWFUL AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO THE COMMISSION'S OWN FINDINGS OF GENERAL
AND SPECIFIC FACTS.

10

After reading the Commission's Findings 4 through
10 aclmowledging the clear public need for additional mobile radio service in central Utah and acknowledging
plaintiff's qualifications to furnish the same, it is difficult
not to be astounded by the Commission's Conclusion that
to grant plaintiff's application would be "clearly against
the public interest". The Commission's Conclusion is
especially baffling in light of Commissioner Hacking's
comments that there is a great public need for additional
mobile radio service and " . . . that no single party, and
maybe no combination of parties can serve that need
... " (See R-532-34).
In spite of the clear public need for additional mobile
radio service and even though Mobile obviously was not
fulfilling that need, the Commission's primary concern
in its later Findings seemed to be to protect Mobile. 'The
Commission found that Mobile had been granted 2 UHF
channels from the FCC prior to June, 1970 but had not
put the channels into service by June, 1971 (R-922 (Find·
ing No. 13)). Mobile represented to the Commission in
June, 1970 that it would have the 2 UHF channels in
service "within thirty days or sixty days" (R-110). There
was no finding why there was such a long delay in imple·
menting service on the UHF channels. The Commission
made no finding when said UHF channels would be put
into operation by Mobile or how much such operation
could or would relieve present crowding and meet the
acknowledged public need.
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The Commission stated in Finding 20b (R-924) that
"the granting of all or some of these channels [to Mobile]
will greatly relieve the present congestion . . . " That
Finding illustrates the Commission's failure to understand the technical operation of mobile radio service. Mobile has had 2 VHF channels in operation since 1966 and
was granted 2 UHF channels in 1970. Because of the
design differences required for the separate frequency
bands, tvm-way mobile telephone units used on VHF
chinmels cannot be used on UHF channels (See R-4 73) .
Mc:hile's channel crowding cannot be relieved on the 2
VHF channels unless Mobile reduces the number of users
on those channels. With the proper equipment Mobile
could tmnsfer some of its VHF subscribers to the UHF
channels but that would reduce the space available for
new subscribers to the UHF channels. The Commission
made no other Finding that the admitted public need
in the central area of Utah could be supplied from any
other source since Finding No. 7 (R-921) states that
Mountain Bell does not intend to obtain more channels
to help fulfill the public need.
In its Finding No. 18, the Commission cited as being
applicable to its present decision an excerpt from one of
its previous orders in a similar case. The Commission
stated that:

. . . If there is to be any exclusive obligation
and right connected with a certificate of convenience and necessity, it must follow that the
of the certificate of convenience and necessity
must be provided protection from competitive ser-
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vice that could seriously dilute the market and
precipitate serious economic disruption to longterm investments....
The implication of the Commission's statement is
that granting plaintiff's application would "precipitate
serious economic disruption to [Mobile's] long-term investments" and "could seriously dilute the [Mobile's]
market". The Commission made no finding that Mobile
has long-term investments or that serious disruption
would result to Mobile or to any one else if plaintiff were
granted a certificate. In fact, the Commission had just
previously found on May 25, 1971 in another case that
all of Mobile's investments were either "short term" or
"relatively short term" (Case No. 6359, Finding No. 6).
Moreover, the Commission made no finding that Mobile's
market would be "seriously diluted" or diluted at all by
granting plaintiff's application.
The Commission also stated in Finding No. 18 that
the "measure of such adequacy ["to adequately serve the
public"] would be the extent to which the holder [Mo·
bile] keeps abreast of current technological advances
within the industry." That statement is incredible. It
would seem without question that "adequacy" would have
to be determined principally by measuring the rota!
amount of available mobile radio service against the pub·
lic's needs at a given time. It is submitted that if those
who desired mobile radio service were given a choice
whether to have "current technological advances" such
as pushbutton telephones, they would choose to have dial
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telephones rather than no telephone service at all as is
presently the situation.
The Commission's reliance on Eck Miller Transfer
Co. v. Armes, 269 S. W. 2d 287 (Ky. 1954) in support of
its Conclusion is misplaced. The facts in this case clearly
show a substantial deficiency of service facilities. Because the Commission's own Findings show there is a
large and expanding market in which the available mobile
radio service is grossly inadequate, the Eck Miller citation by the Commission actually supports plaintiff's position that Mobile has been and is unable to render adequate service. The Commission should not be allowed
to assume gratuitously that Mobile can fulfill the public
need.
It is submitted that the Conclusion of the Commission denying plaintiff's application is utterly inconsistent
with the Commission's own Findings and should be reversed.

POINT II.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION UNLAWFULLY APPLIED THE TERM "DUPLICATION OF SERVICE" TO THE NON WIREL IN E MOBILE TELEPHONE BUSINESS
WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION.
Finding No. 18 states that "This Commission previously denied a similar application for duplication of ser-
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vice ... " The Commission's statement assumes that two
companies in the same utility area are automatically
duplicating service if they both offer the same commodity to the public. That assumption is not correct in the
non wire-line RCC mobile telephone business.
The term "duplication of service" as used in public
utility law originally meant the duplication of very expensive capital investments by two separate companies
and did not merely indicate that where two companies
offered the same commodity there was capacity in excess
of the needs of the public. See Kentucky Utilities Com·
pany, et al. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 252 S. W.
2d 885 (Ky. 1952).
The history of public utility law shows how the con·
cept of "duplication" developed, and why it is especially
inapplicable to the non wire-line mobile telephone busi·
ness where there is a clear public need in excess of avail·
able service. As cities and urban areas developed in the
United States, many private companies entered the busi·
ness of supplying the populace in those areas with such
life-sustaining commodities as electricity, gas for heating,
culinary water, and telephone communications. To im·
plement their businesses these companies were required
to make very large capital investments. They had to pur·
chase land, execute leases and obtain rights of way and
easements. In addition, they usually had to finance and
construct manufacturing or other generating facilities as
well as provide some type of fixed transmission lines such
as pipes or wires necessary to transport their products to
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the consumers. The products of these companies were
utilized by and became essential to nearly every business
establishment and residence in the service area.
In some instances more than one company attempted
to supply the same essential product to consumers in the
same locality. This usually caused a duplication of costly
investments because two companies then had to build
transmission lines and make other investments in fixed
facilities in the same community in an attempt to serve
essentinlly the same customers. This often resulted in
one or both of the companies losing money, going out of
business and thus depriving members of the public of
these essential products.
In an effort to protect the public against this grievous
loss, national and local governments began (1) to regulate
the conditions under which these companies operated,
and (2) to establish rules governing the entrance of new
companies into the same businesses. The companies
which provided these essential life-sustaining products
became known as "public utilities", and the rules of public
convenience and necessity were developed. Such companies as Mountain Fuel Supply, Utah Power & Light
and Mountain Bell are examples of the traditional public
utility.
As time has passed, however, the scope of "public
utilities" has been enlarged and many other businesses
have been included under the original definition. Consequently, the regulatory agencies have often been burdened to apply the original concepts to numerous new
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businesses which, in many instances, have very few of
the attributes of the historic "public utility". These busi.
nesses have in some cases accidentally become public util.
ities by the technical language of statutory law. They
are in reality pseudo public utilities and should be legally
recognized as such.
Even though the historic public utility was often
made an absolute monopoly to protect the public in a
given area, it was soon discovered that the public interest
did not require that all statutory public utilities needed
to be monopolies. Utah has recognized this development.
In Pritchard Transfer, Inc. v. W. D. Hatch Co., 21 Utah
2nd 106, 441 P. 2d 135 (1968), this Court held that even
where there has been a substantial capital investment in
equipment such as semi-trucks and trailers the Public
Service Commission is not required to maintain a monopo·
listic position for the existing carrier. Also see Union Pa·
cific Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah
459, 135 P. 2d 915 (1943), wherein this Court stated,
The discretionary power granted the Commission
by the act, to grant or withhold certificates, nega·
tives the idea that it was intended to grant and
maintain a monopoly in any field. The fact that
the act provides that the Commission may grant
a certificate when it determines that public con·
venience and necessity requires such services rec·
ognizes that regulated competition is as much
within the provisions of the act as is regulated
monopoly. In the exercise of its powers to grant
or withhold certificates of convenience and neces·
sity, questions of impairment of vested or property
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rights cannot very well arise. No one can have a
vested right to be free from competition, to have
a monopoly against the public.
Many other states with public utility statutes similar
to Utah's have held that the term "public convenience
and necessity" means the convenience of the public and
not the convenience of an individual doing a limited business. See Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 192 Kan. 575, 389 P. 2d 813 (1964).
Moreover, the term is an elastic one and the existence
of a presently certified utility does not deprive the regulatory body of authority to issue an additional certificate
if it is in the public good to do so. See Dahlen Transport,
Inc. v. Hahne, 261 Minn. 218, 112 N. W. 2d 630. Also see
San Diego & Coronado Ferry Co. v. Railroad Commisswn
of California, 210 Cal. 504, 292 Pac. 640.
The question in this case arises because non wire-line
RCC's are technically included as public utilities by the
statute but bear almost no resemblance to the traditional
public utility such as Mountain Bell because of (1) their
negligible investment in fixed facilities and equipment,
(2) their very small scope of operation, and (3) the very
small percentage of the public served by them. Because
non wire-line RCC's are a relatively recent development
in the public utility field, it is extremely questionable
whether the historic rules can be applied in this case
where there is a manifest public need greatly in excess of
available service.
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There is another paramount difference between a
non wire-line RCC and a wire-line telephone company,
The non wire-line RCC, even though it may be technically
a public utility, is basically a private business which is
not required to make its service available to the whole
public but can limit its business to any size it desires or
even go out of business. Thus, where a non wire-line RCC
is not subject to the same responsibilities as the authentic
public utility, it is incongruous to give it the same protection and benefits. In fact, it is doubtful that Mobile
qualifies as a conventional public utility under the deli·
nition given by this Court in both Crystal Car Line v.
State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 P. 2d 984
(1946), and in Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Com·
mission, 98 Utah 466, 100 P. 2d 571 (1940).
In Garkane at 573 P. 2d, this Court stated:
The test ... is ... whether the public has a legal
right to the use which cannot be gainsaid, or de·
nied, or withdrawn, at the pleasure of the owner.
Even if the public could demand Mobile's service, Mobile
can go out of business or fail to implement sufficient ser·
vice to supply that demand. And since Mobile is obvi·
ously not able to serve but a very small percentage of the
public need at the present time, it seems clear that as a
practical matter the public at large cannot demand and
receive Mobile's service. In fact, Mobile has only two
full time employees (R-10-11).
It is apparent that the term "duplication" is not eas·
ily applied to a non wire-line RCC which has no large

.
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capital investment in wire lines, line easements and poles
or power generation facilities as are required for Mountain Bell's operations. Moreover, the only real similarity
between the non wire-line RCC and Mountain Bell is the
fact that the RCC often uses the same type of hand tele.
phone instrument. Certainly the initial capital investment
by an RCC is probably less than that required for a
modern service station on an urban street corner. The
term "duplication" of service, if not inappropriate altogether, cannot be applied with the same significance to
an RCC as it is to a wire-line telephone company. There
is certainly no duplication of service or investment as such
in the airways through and by which the RCC utilizes
its operations inasmuch as the FCC assigns separate
broadcast channels to each RCC and the channels are
operative without interference almost anywhere in the
reception area. There are at least 17 unassigned channels presently available from the FCC for use by non
wire-line RCC's in central Utah.
In this case the only way "duplication" could reasonably apply would be if there were an excess of capacity
over need. It is without question from the Commission's
own Findings that there is presently a much larger market than Mobile has capacity to serve. Thus, it would
appear that the term "duplication" as it is used in public
utility law has no application in this case because (1)
there is no excess capacity over need, (2) there has not
been the kind of investment by Mobile to which the term
"duplication" applies, and (3) Mobile is really only a pub-
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lie utility by technicality and is not entitled to the same
monopolistic protection as is given to a wire-line telephone
company. It is significant that only Mobile protested
the granting of plaintiff's application and that Mountain
Bell, the authentic public utility, did not.

POINT III.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION'S
FINDING THAT MOBILE ACTIVELY
SOUGHT TO FULFILL THE PUBLIC NEED
IS ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT IGNORED UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY THAT MOBILE KNOWINGLY
AND WILLFULLY FILED IMPROPER AND
UNWORKABLE CHANNEL APPLICATIONS
WITH THE FCC WHEN MOBILE KNEW IT
NEEDED MORE CHANNEL SPACE.
Mobile has had 2 VHF channels in service since 1966
and has had approximately the same number of subscrih·
ers ( 63) using those channels since that time. Mobile's
two-way telephone subscribers for each year are as fol·
lows:
December, 1966 63 (R-826 (Exhibit 51, p. B-11))
December, 1967 59 (R-826 (Exhibit 51, p. B-11))
December, 1968 61 (R-826 (Exhibit 51, p. B-11))
December, 1969 61 (R-826 (Exhibit 51, p. B-11))
December, 1970 59 (R-826 (Exhibit 51, p. B-11))
April,

1971 63 (R-103)

Mobile had known about the crowded channel problem for several years but first filed with the FCC for additional channels on October 28, 1969 (R-42). Instead
of filing for VHF channels which would clearly have alleviated its crowded condition, Mobile filed for UHF chanmJs which would not. See discussion under POINT I
above. Moreover, Mobile did not even file with the FCC
for the UHF channels until after another company had
just previously filed for the identical UHF channels even
though there were at least ten other UHF channels available to Mobile and not filed on by anyone else. Mobile
told the Commission in June, 1970 that it would have the
2 UHF channels in service within 30 to 60 days. Also
it was not until just prior to plaintiff's first hearing in
June, 1970 that Mobile filed with the FCC for any additional VHF channels (R-472, 506).
Mobile's applications for both the UHF and VHF
channels were admittedly defective because the applications were for wire-line connections to the point of transmission on the mountain when there were no wire lines
and Mobile knew it (R-50-53, 56-57) . The FCC granted
Mobile 2 UHF channels prior to June, 1970 but since
there were no wire lines for connection Mobile had to file
an amended application for a wireless connection to the
point of transmission on the mountain (R-516). Mobile
did not file the amendment for the UHF wireless connection until November, 1970. Moreover, Mobile had not
even filed an amendment with the FCC for its defective
application for VHF channels at the time of plaintiff's
hearing in June, 1971 (R-516).
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Harold Mordkofsky testified that Mobile's applica.
tion for the identical UHF channels which another per.
son had just previously filed for was a "strike" application
which was an illegal technique employed to block the
granting of channels to the prior applicant (R-511-16).
In light of the above and because of the fact that
Mobile did not have any additional channels in operation
in June, 1971, it was wholly arbitrary and unreasonable
for the Commission to conclude that Mobile had "filed
and actively presented applications to the Federal Com·
munication Commission."
The Commission's Finding 20a (R-924) that Mobile
has "constantly, earnestly and energetically sought w
and has substantially upgraded and expanded its service"
is wholly contradicted by that Commission's own "ex·
pert", Amos R. Jackson, who admitted that he had never
inspected Mobile's facilities or operation to determine '
what Mobile was doing in its business. In addition, Mo·
bile had not placed the UHF channels in service within
30 to 60 days as it had promised the Commission in June,
1970.
It is submitted that the Commission's Findings con·

cerning Mobile are arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious
because they are (1) either not supported by any eVI·
dence or (2) are contrary to testimony given in the hear·
ing.

1'
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POINT IV.
THE PUB L I C SERVICE COMMISSION'S
RELIANCE ON AMOS R. JACKSON
NEGATED THE PRESUMPTION OF EXPERTNESS AF F 0 RD ED THE COMMISSION'S DECISION AND SUCH RELIANCE
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF
JACKSON'S RELATIONSHIP WITH MO BILE.
Although the Commission is given a presumption of
expertness, that presumption may be rebutted. Lewis v.
Wycoff Co., Inc., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P. 2d 264 (1966).
In the present case, Amos R. Jackson represented the
Commission as its expert at the plaintiff's hearing. Commissioner Hacking admitted that Jackson was not an
expert in regard to the mobile radio telephone business.
Jackson does not have a license from the FCC and has
had no formal training in mobile radio.
Jackson had the responsibility of evaluating the business of common carriers for the Commission but had never
inspected the facilities or operation of Mobile although
he had met with Mobile's president "10 or 15 times".
Jackson is not an attorney but advised the Commission on the legal aspects of mobile radio service.
It is submitted that because Jackson was admittedly
not an expert and that he had not inspected Mobile's
facilities the presumption of the Commission's expertness
or special knowledge is clearly rebutted. The Commission

24

had no expert basis whatever to uphold its Conclusion
denying plaintiff's application.
Jackson was the principal in a business ( Intermoun.
tain) that had performed services for and billed Mobile.
Jackson was a consultant to Telpower, a corporation
which employed his teenage children and which was run
by his brother. Intermountain, Telpower and Jackson
all had the same office address and the same telephone
number. Telpower furnished services to Mobile and as·
sisted Mobile in preparing exhibits for use in hearings be·
fore the Commission in spring, 1971. Jackson consulted
with his brother and Telpower in regard to Mobile's ex·
hibits to be used before the Commission. Telpower was
providing management services to Mobile at the time o!
plaintiff's hearing. These facts were before the Commis·
SlOn.

It is a denial of due process of law to allow a person
having conflicting interests to a petitioner to participate
in or advise a judicial or quasi-judicial body in relation
to a decision concerning such petitioner. Plaintiff was
absolutely entitled to "fair treatment" and "reasonable
action". 16A C. J. S., Constitutional Law § 567. After
the Commission recognized the public need and plaintiff's
ability, it should not be allowed to discriminate in favor
of a monopoly for the existing inadequate service.

CONCLUSION
In light of the Commission's own Findings, the Coro·
mission's Conclusion denying plaintiff's application is pal·
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ently arbitrary and unreasonable. The Commission did
not follow the applicable law and by its own admission
is not entitled to a presumption of expertness in this case.
The Commission's own expert was benefitting personally
or through his family for services rendered to Mobile who
was the only person who protested plaintiff's application.
In addition, said expert was consulting with his brother
and Telpower about exhibits for Mobile used in hearings
in spring, 1971.

It is submitted that to grant plaintiff's application
for a certificate of convenience and necessity would not
be a "duplication of service" as that term is used in public utility law. The obviously great public need for more
mobile radio service is not being fulfilled at present. The
Commission's Conclusion is patently in error and should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER P. FABER, JR.
WATKINS & FABER
606 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
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